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Summary
The idea behind the establishment of European Works Councils (EWCs) is that 
these are bodies which should be informed and consulted on company decisions 
and actions. This information is then subsequently to be spread locally by employee 
representatives on the EWC in order to keep the entire European workforce up-to-
date with the firm’s most important measures. 
However, this flow of information is often disrupted by confidentiality constraints 
imposed by management. Confidentiality is used to protect sensitive information 
from leaking and thus it limits representatives from sharing information with the 
workforce. In principle, only early and sensitive information should be subject to 
confidentiality requirements. On top of this, management might also decide to 
withhold information from the EWC. This would change the situation regarding 
confidentiality. If information is withheld, the EWC is informed later when that 
information has lost its sensitive nature and confidentiality should no longer be 
required.
In previous years, much research has been done on information and consultation 
practices in EWCs. Although information sharing and confidentiality are directly 
linked with one another, little is known about confidentiality practices, issues and 
strategies. What experiences do employee representative have with confidentiality? 
Are demands for confidentiality being misused by management? How do 
representatives cope with confidentiality and the withholding of information by 
management?
Three central research questions are: (1) what are the different practices of 
confidentiality and the withholding of information in EWCs; (2) what are the 
different handling strategies EWC representatives use in order to deal with 
confidential information; and (3) how do these handling strategies affect the 
functioning of the EWC and the employee representatives themselves?
These research questions are addressed in this study using both qualitative and 
quantitative data. Four case studies on EWCs were carried out, based on several 
semi-structured interviews. From these case studies, we first draw a general 
assessment of how each EWC functions based on the typology developed by Lecher 
et al. (2001). Next, the (legitimate) use of the confidentiality label by management 
is discussed. We consider confidentiality to be legitimate when information 
is provided in a timely manner but has a sensitive nature. In this situation, 
management has the right to consider information as confidential. In contrast, 
we consider confidentiality to be illegitimate when information is disclosed late to 
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the EWC and/or it has no sensitive nature. Here, the management has no right to 
prevent the EWC informing employees. In a third step, we look at how employee 
representatives deal with this confidentiality and any withholding of information. 
How an EWC reacts to confidentiality issues is related to, and could affect, 
the general functioning of the EWC. Based on existing models from industrial 
psychology, we distinguish between several different handling mechanisms. 
Representatives on three out of the four EWCs included as case studies evaluated 
information and consultation provision as late and minimal, which explains why 
most EWCs may be defined as a ‘symbolic’ or ‘service provider’ EWC. In only one of 
the case studies did representatives say that it operated under a timely and effective 
information and consultation procedure; this one may, therefore, be defined as 
a ‘project-oriented’ or ‘participatory’ EWC. The same three EWCs with minimal 
information and consultation procedures were confronted with illegitimate and 
strict confidentiality constraints and the withholding of information. Employee 
representatives tried to cope with these strict constraints by challenging 
management or making compromises. The support of a trade union coordinator 
helped to strengthen these strategies. However, this did not lead to the provision 
of earlier and more sensitive information. In only one EWC, and in one select 
committee of an EWC, did employee representatives receive early information. 
While we might have expected management to put (legitimate) confidentiality 
requirements on this information, it did not. Paradoxically, these case studies 
demonstrated that, where information was non-sensitive and late, management 
imposed (illegitimate) confidentiality requirements; and, where it was sensitive 
and early, it did not. 
These insights were subsequently cross-checked using survey data from 1,635 EWC 
and SEWC (European Company Works Council) members. The survey findings 
generally confirm the observations based on the case studies: EWC members who 
think management withholds information are also more likely to feel limited in 
discussing information because of the ‘confidential’ labelling; at the same time, 
EWC members who think management shares all information also feel much more 
free to talk about that information. 
The paradoxical situation that we have established goes against the reasoning 
that labelling information as confidential can enable employers to share early and 
sensitive information with the EWC; it is more in line with the reasoning that, 
where employers do not want the EWC to function, they use several means (not 
providing information, marking everything as confidential) to limit it.
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1. Introduction
‘What goes on in Europe stays in Europe,’ declared an employee representative 
recently in a training session. He was positive about his work as an employee 
representative in the European Works Council (EWC) of his company. The 
company’s management informed the representatives about the current state of 
the company and about future projects. They could voice their views and really 
influence decisions. The flip side was that everything that was being discussed 
was termed ‘confidential’. By no means was he able to inform the employees he 
represented, discuss the formation of a common view or obtain advice from the 
trade union. Early information and real consultation came with demands for strict 
confidentiality. 
As this story shows, employee representatives do not have the easiest task on 
their hands. Their job is to represent and defend the interests of employees. In 
order to fulfil their role as a representative of the workforce, they need up-to-date 
information about the firm’s affairs, such as (probable future) decisions, strategic 
plans and business operations. 
However, such information may be sensitive and could damage the interests of 
the company if made public. This kind of information could also cause (possibly 
unnecessary) unrest amongst employees; it is therefore often defined as 
confidential. To continue getting this kind of confidential information, employee 
representatives thus need to show management they can be trusted as well as 
discreet. 
At the same time, this requirement conflicts with their responsibility to represent 
the views of employees. To fulfil this role, they need to discuss these issues with 
employees, report back on debates and ask for input. This communication with 
the workforce is necessary in order to deliver a universally agreed response to 
management.
Employee representatives are thus confronted with conflicting (and competing) 
roles and tasks when it comes to confidential information (Hammer et al. 
1991). Even though reporting back to employees is one of the most important 
duties of a representative, they are often restricted by the ‘confidentiality’ label. 
Communicating with employees and respecting confidentiality to ensure that 
management provides enough information, and at the right time, is a delicate 
balancing act. In order to do their work properly, confidentiality rules therefore 
need to be bent or broken (Hannah and Robertson 2015). 
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Virtually all employee representatives face this problem but, in this paper, the 
focus will be on employee representatives on European Works Councils (EWCs) (or 
European Company Works Councils – SEWCs). These transnational institutions of 
employee information and consultation bring together employee representatives 
from different countries with the senior management of a multinational company 
to discuss transnational issues such as the company’s strategy, employment 
forecasts, cross-border restructuring, etc. (De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2015). 
The EWC is, in theory, kept informed about general company strategy, large merger 
cases or strategic investments – sensitive issues which, if made public, might 
seriously damage the company and its employees. For employee representatives 
on these EWCs, this confidentiality issue can be even more difficult as the EWC 
brings together representatives from very different industrial relations traditions 
that might have divergent opinions on what is confidential and how information 
should be treated.
Previous studies have indeed indicated that there are issues regarding the use, 
misuse and abuse of the confidentiality label in EWCs. A 2016 survey commissioned 
by the European Commission of 37 EWCs showed that 15 per cent of employers 
strongly agreed with the statement that the EWC information and consultation 
process led to breaches of confidentiality. In contrast, only two per cent of the 
employees surveyed were of the same opinion (ICF 2016). Earlier research 
had shown that real breaches of confidentiality were exceptional (GHK 2007); 
however, while breaches might be the exception rather than the rule, the topic 
is still one that raises concerns. For companies listed on the stock exchange in 
particular, detailed planning is needed on some issues like mergers, acquisitions 
or major restructuring (Pulignano and Turk 2016: 29). Based on these and other 
insights, the European Trade Union Confederation included the demand to clarify 
confidentiality rules in its 2017 position paper on the future of EWCs (ETUC 2017).
The literature and evidence in practice clearly shows that confidentiality is an issue 
for employee representatives on EWCs (Hoffmann 2006). In some case studies, 
the subject is touched upon, but rarely developed in detail (De Spiegelaere and 
Jagodziński 2016; Steiert 2001; Telljohann 2011). De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 
(2016), for example, state that the use and misuse of confidentiality requirements 
in EWCs can conflict with the employee representatives’ right and obligation to 
report back to the workforce. In the case studies edited by Telljohann (2011), the 
researchers looked into the ‘inner life’ of EWCs with the objective of attaining 
a broader view of the interaction processes and operations of different EWCs. 
Unsurprisingly, they also ran into the same confidentiality issues with which 
employee representatives are confronted, although these issues were not discussed 
in detail in the paper. Prior research thus notes confidentiality as an important 
point for attention concerning the goal of making EWCs a properly functioning 
instrument for social dialogue. 
In this working paper, we aim to contribute to the debate and knowledge about 
confidentiality in European Works Councils by describing and discussing two 
sources of information: one qualitative and one quantitative.
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2. Qualitative and quantitative sources
This working paper starts out from insights developed out of four explorative 
case studies in which we tried to get an image of how EWC representatives treat 
confidential information, why they do what they do and how this affects their EWC 
and themselves as individuals. Building on the one hand on the EWC typology 
literature and, on the other, on industrial psychological literature, these case 
studies aim to clarify the kind of confidentiality issues that EWCs come up against; 
how they cope with this; and how this affects representatives’ individual and 
collective performance. The central research questions in this respect are:
1.  What are the different practices concerning confidentiality and the withholding 
of information in EWCs?
2.  Which handling strategies do EWC representatives adopt in order to deal with 
confidential information?
3.  How do these handling strategies affect the functioning of the EWC and of the 
employee representatives themselves?
These case studies are of an explorative nature. They are, to our knowledge, the 
first to examine the subject of confidentiality in EWCs in a detailed way, drawing 
on the literature on EWCs and in the field of industrial psychology. The aim of 
the research is thus to approach this subject using a broad theoretical framework 
of EWC types and handling strategies, but without clear hypotheses – at least, at 
the outset – on how the one should relate, or lead, to the other. Four EWCs were 
selected with the aim of developing points of comparison. 
All the companies have strong representation in Belgium and three of them have 
an EWC based on Belgian law (A, B and D). The fourth EWC is based on Dutch 
law (C). The selection of cases conformed to good reason: two cases (A and C) 
were selected because they were known to have had some rather serious debates 
regarding confidentiality in the past; while a third (D) was selected because of its 
good practices concerning information and consultation. The last case study (B) 
was selected based on ease of access considerations.
In all cases, members of the EWC and the trade union coordinator were approached 
for semi-structured interviews. EWC members were able to offer first-hand 
information about their EWC and company, while the trade union coordinators 
had a broader understanding of issues in other EWCs (Eisenhardt 1989). As can 
be seen in Table 1, a total of ten interviews were conducted. The norm for the 
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number of interviews for credible research into organisations and workplaces, as 
defined by Saunders and Townsend (2016), is 15-60 interviewees although they 
do acknowledge the scope for some exceptions. In this research, for example, the 
aim was not to generalise the results; the focus really lay on exploring this under-
researched topic and pointing out some of the areas of concern around it.
The interviews each took sixty to ninety minutes. Every interview was taped and 
transcribed. The interview guide included four general sections: introduction and 
enquiry into the representative’s function and the system of reporting back to the 
EWC; general questions on the functioning of the EWC; questions regarding the 
prevalence and nature of confidential information; and an enquiry into good and 
bad examples of how employee representatives have acted regarding confidential 
information. 
Table 1 The cases and interviewees
Sector Interviews Position of respondent in EWC




Member of the EWC
Member of the EWC and former member of the select committee
EWC B Chemical Trade union coordinator B
Employee representative 1B
Employee representative 2B
Trade union coordinator 
Secretary of the select committee
Vice-president of the select committee
EWC C Hotel and travel Trade union coordinator C
Employee representative 1C
Trade union coordinator
Former member of the EWC
EWC D Chemical Employee representative 1D
Employee representative 2D
Member of the EWC
Secretary of the select committee
Next to this qualitative source of information, this working paper explores 
quantitative data from the largest survey of European Works Council representatives 
carried out to date (De Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2019). This survey collected 
questionnaire responses from 1,635 EWC (and SEWC) representatives from all 
European countries. A weighting factor was used to correct for over- and under-
response based on three variables: (1) country of origin; (2) sector of activity of the 
EWC; and (3) whether the respondent came from an EWC or a SEWC. 
In the survey, three statements were included regarding confidentiality and the 
withholding of information in EWCs. Representatives were invited to indicate 
whether they agreed or disagreed with the statements using a 5-point scale from 
‘totally agree’ to ‘neutral’ to ‘totally disagree’, plus the possibility to indicate ‘don’t 
know’ or ‘not applicable’. The statements were as follows:
 – management often refuses to give information on grounds of confidentiality
 – I often feel limited in talking about my EWC work to the employees I 
represent because of concerns about confidentiality
 – employee representatives often challenge management over what 
information is confidential. 
Based on the qualitative research, several hypotheses were developed regarding 
confidentiality issues and particular patterns that arose. These hypotheses were 
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then checked as regards their applicability to the broader population of EWC/
SEWC representatives using data from the quantitative research. 
The rest of this working paper is structured as follows. First, the case studies will be 
discussed in relation to each topic: information and consultation; confidentiality 
and the withholding of information; and dealing with confidentiality requirements 
with a view to improving the operation of the EWC. Through our analyses, it 
became clear that, in some cases, the select committee had contrasting experiences 
concerning information, consultation and confidentiality. Therefore, where there 
are significant differences between the experiences of the EWC and of the select 
committee, these are discussed separately. The data are considered first using a 
within-case analysis in which we analyse, separately in each case, information 
and consultation, confidentiality and handling mechanisms. Second, the cases are 
compared using cross-case analysis (Eisenhardt 1989; Yin 1994) and hypotheses 
developed. Next, the survey results are presented and discussed in relation to the 
case study findings. Lastly, an overall discussion and conclusion is presented. 
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3. Analysis of the case studies
3.1. Information and consultation
According to Fitzgerald and Stirling (2004), there are three Cs which prevent 
EWCs from realising their full potential: consultation; co-determination; and 
confidentiality. Focusing on the last of these, the authors argue that management 
might hesitate to provide sufficient and timely information out of fear of breaking 
stock market rules. Yet, despite the identification of confidentiality as one of the 
main obstacles to a well-functioning EWC, little attention has been given to this 
issue in the industrial relations literature.
According to the EWC Recast Directive (2009/38/EC), information shall be ‘Given 
at such time, in such fashion and with such content as are appropriate to enable 
employees’ representatives to undertake an in-depth assessment of the possible 
impact.’ Consultation, next, should take place ‘At such time, in such fashion and 
with such content as enables employees’ representative to express an opinion […] 
about the proposed measures.’
If EWCs were informed and consulted in line with the definitions of the Recast 
Directive, confidentiality would often be a legitimate requirement. However, 
many studies have shown that EWCs are not always (or even rarely) informed and 
consulted in a timely and in-depth fashion (GHK 2007; ICF 2016; Stoop 2004; 
Waddington 2011). This means that many EWCs do not manage to become fully 
involved in the company decision-making process and are, instead, sidelined.
One of the most influential approaches regarding EWC efficacy is the typology 
made by Lecher et al. (2001). They distinguish between four types of EWCs based 
on the degree to which the management recognises the body as legitimate and the 
degree to which there is either a cohesive or competitive logic between employee 
representatives from different countries. The different types are listed here from 
the most passive to the most active:
(1)  ‘Symbolic’ EWCs exist formally but have very little real activity. The information 
provided is minimal and there is little to no consultation. Management drives 
the process and EWC members take little initiative to upgrade the functioning 
of the works council.
(2)  ‘Service provider’ EWCs obtain information and are involved in disseminating 
this to their constituencies but there is no real consultation. These EWCs are 
quite often characterised by a strong national chair, or team, which leads the 
process. The EWC is therefore seen as serving national-level processes of 
information and consultation.
EWC Confidential
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(3) ‘Project-oriented’ EWCs are more proactive in organising working groups. 
They focus on the development of some projects which aim to improve 
transnational information and consultation. There is a sufficient exchange of 
information and real consultation of employees.
(4) ‘Participatory’ EWCs are characterised by well-functioning employee 
representation and a management which appreciates employee input. These 
EWCs tend to go beyond the mere legal requirements of the Directive.
In short, these classifications are based on the level of information, consultation 
and participation in the EWC. ‘Symbolic’ EWCs have the lowest level of this as 
they are the least effective of the four types. In contrast, ‘participatory’ EWCs have 
the highest level and allow for indirect employee involvement and participation.
These four types of EWCs all feature, in different ways, four so-called fields of 
interaction which are of interest to our study of confidentiality. They concern the 
interactions between:
(1)  The EWC and management: this field of interaction refers to the degree to 
which management sees the EWC as a legitimate partner. In ‘symbolic’ and 
‘service-oriented’ EWCs this is hardly ever the case. As a consequence, the 
information provided is insufficient and there is no real consultation process. 
Regarding confidentiality, we can assume that the first two types of EWCs 
will be faced with managements which use confidentiality to avoid giving 
information. We might thus speak of an unjustified – or illegitimate – use of 
confidentiality. When there is sufficient information (as for the last two types 
of EWC), confidentiality may also be used but could be justified given the 
potentially damaging nature of the information.
(2)  EWC members internally: this second field of interaction refers to relations 
between employee representatives. This can be characterised by open or 
concealed conflict, by cohesion or by the existence of a clear dominant (group 
of) employee representative(s). In cases of open conflict (more present in 
‘symbolic’ EWCs), keeping information confidential might be a real challenge 
as some EWC representatives might communicate amongst each other on 
their own terms.
(3)  The EWC and the national level: this refers to communication between the 
European and national levels of employee representation. Again, these relations 
might be constructive or very unsubstantial. Regarding confidentiality, strong 
relations between these levels (as is present in ‘participatory’ EWCs) might 
make it difficult for EWC representatives to keep information to themselves.
(4)  The EWC and trade unions: this last field of interaction concerns the role of the 
trade union in relation to the EWC. Trade union support might enable EWCs 
to challenge the unjust use of confidentiality and thus improve transparency. 
On the other hand, it might increase management’s unwillingness to disclose 
sensitive information where third parties are present.
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Table 2 Extra information about the cases









EWC A 2000 Belgian Article 6 agreement 24 employee representatives 1 meeting/year USA
EWC B 2003 Belgian Article 6 agreement 24 employee representatives 2 meetings/year Belgium
EWC C 2014 Dutch Article 6 agreement 25 employee representatives 1 meeting/year USA
EWC D 1995 Belgian Article 13 agreement 24 employee representatives 1 meeting/year Belgium
3.1.1. European Works Council A
In Table 2, further information – such as year of establishment, size of EWC, etc. 
– is provided for the different case studies. 
As can be seen from this overview, EWC A has 24 employee representatives. It 
meets once a year and can call for extraordinary meetings. It was established in 
2000 and still functions under that first agreement. Legally speaking, EWC A falls 
under Article 6 of European Directive 94/45/EG, which means it should fully 
meet the requirements of the Directive. This EWC, based in a USA-headquartered 
company, is characterised by late-arriving information and almost no consultation. 
The EWC has relations with the European management but not with the American 
senior management. The senior management is wary of the EWC’s influence and 
tries to play everything strictly according to the (legal) rules:
‘It’s a very legal company. Everything goes through the lawyers. They do what 
they are legally required to do, but nothing more. They try to keep everything 
as minimal as possible.’ (Employee representative 2A)
In terms of the information and consultation procedure, interviewees gave a 
rather bleak picture. Information often comes only at the last moment before 
implementation and management tries to reduce the consultation process to 
something akin to a pro forma exercise:
‘The decision is already taken. All research is done in secret by them and only 
at the last moment are we informed. (…) If we give advice, we always get an 
explanation but it is always directed towards fitting in with their story. (…) In 
the end, they just do what they want and don’t take our advice into account.’ 
(Employee representative 1A)
Despite late information and inadequate consultation, EWC members still try to 
get the best out of the EWC and use it as an active instrument, even if they face 
serious obstacles in achieving common positions. They use written statements and 
try to enforce a real process of consultation. The EWC is mentored by a trade 
union coordinator who has adopted a very active role, stimulating the employee 
representatives to respond more actively through written statements and trying 
to improve the EWC’s internal cooperation. In this way, local information is also 
shared internally, which makes it possible to circumvent management’s late 
information in some cases. The overall image is one of a ‘service provider’ EWC:
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‘We try to enforce this [consultation] by writing a statement (…) about what’s 
said during the meeting. This is a signal to the management to say “Look, these 
are our opinions on the points we’ve discussed. We want you to take these into 
account.” But it [the statement] is also a signal towards the local levels to let 
them know which topics we thought were important.’ (Union coordinator A)
Employee representative 2A is a member of the EWC and a former member of the 
select committee. He describes the role of the select committee as a working group 
which tries to improve certain organisational aspects of the EWC and to achieve a 
smoother information flow. The committee tries to do so by repeatedly indicating 
and highlighting the rights of the EWC on certain topics. However, this committee 
does not receive information any earlier than the EWC. 
3.1.2. European Works Council B
EWC B is composed of 24 members. It meets twice a year and has a select 
committee which plays a very active role and meets at least four times a year. 
The EWC was founded in 2003 and did not draw on any prior EWC agreements. 
As with EWC A, this EWC operates under an Article 6 agreement. The select 
committee is composed of four members and both our interviewees are members 
of this committee. The company is headquartered in Belgium, in the same location 
as the two Belgian members of the select committee. This enables them to have 
close contact with senior management and is a contributing factor to the active 
role being played by the select committee in this EWC. In one way, the EWC and 
the select committee can be seen as two institutions with their own logics and ways 
of functioning. This is why we analyse them separately.
The functioning of this EWC is comparable with that in EWC A, although it is not 
as active as that of A. Information often comes late and there is little room for 
real consultation. There are often lengthy discussions on what information and 
consultation really means:
‘Apparently the management has a very different view. What do we mean by 
information? Being informed before the decision is taken. As such we can con-
sult and see if there are any alternative solutions possible. (…) But the manage-
ment? They do the information and consultation at the same time. (…) The de-
cision they took is already being implemented.’ (Employee representative 1B)
The EWC tries to deal with this situation by writing minutes of the meeting which 
summarise everything and communicating these to the local level in the attempt 
to force management into a more real consultation process. The members thus try 
to push for the EWC to function better, but only do so in a limited way. EWC B 
appears overall to function similarly to A, but we would nevertheless define it overall 
as a ‘symbolic’ EWC because members often receive information after decisions 
have been taken and implemented, whereas in EWC A they receive information 
after decisions have been taken but before implementation. Furthermore, the 
trade union coordinator of EWC B takes a less active and guiding approach than 
those of A (and C), although this is principally due to the assertive attitude of the 
select committee in B. The activity of EWC B is also affected by this, as the select 
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committee tends to take over the role of the EWC as the potentially active partner 
of management.
The select committee of EWC B is a very active body. It anticipates events and 
is assertive towards management. Here, information comes often very early 
and has a sensitive nature. In this way, the select committee is being consulted 
effectively. The consultation process occurs early enough to take the advice of the 
select committee into account. The committee is dominated by the two Belgian 
delegates, although neither is the president of the committee. According to the 
trade union coordinator, the select committee tends to take over some of the roles 
of the EWC; it is often consulted without the EWC being involved. The select 
committee members try to keep EWC members updated on their activities, but 
this does not always work out smoothly because of the confidential nature of the 
information they receive. 
Therefore, even though the EWC is, in general, a ‘symbolic’ type, the select 
committee is a more ‘project-oriented’ body.
‘It is a very well-functioning committee that is highly anticipatory and also 
particularly assertive. They meet with the management on a regular basis. They 
really demand that they receive information.’ (Trade union coordinator B)
3.1.3. European Works Council C
EWC C has 25 members. It meets once a year and the select committee also meets 
at least once a year. Contrary to EWCs A, B and D, the EWC functions under Dutch 
law but, like EWC A, the company is headquartered in the US. The employee 
representative interviewed had just left the EWC. EWC C was established fairly 
recently, in 2014, and so it functions under this agreement (which is also an Article 
6 agreement). 
As with EWCs A and B, the information shared with the EWC often comes late 
and there is little room for consultation. Management keeps strict control over the 
meetings: questions have to be sent before the meeting in writing and are treated 
as ‘any other business’ on the agenda. Questions asked during the meeting are 
barely addressed. Just as in EWC A, employee representatives believe this could 
be explained by the American mentality. 
‘The management’s approach was to keep the EWC as passive as possible. In 
order to keep full control over everything. (…) Just ask for advice. What is the 
problem?’ (Trade union coordinator C)
Employee representatives have made the attempt to upgrade the role of the EWC 
by challenging management on the late provision of information and by writing 
reports on the most important topics which are used to inform workers locally. 
The EWC has also established an online forum to share local information. By 
doing this, it has sought to speed up the information flow in order to get topics 
earlier on the agenda and thus allow consultation to be more effective. The EWC 
can thus be classified as a ‘service provider’ type.
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Recently, however, the situation has changed with the EWC being informed in a 
more timely manner and properly consulted. A change in management, and the 
union coordinator taking a more active role, is cited among the possible reasons 
for this change. The role of the trade union coordinator is similar to the one in 
EWC A; he plays an active and leading role in the EWC which could be one of 
the reasons why members were properly informed and consulted during the most 
recent EWC meeting. This could be the first sign of the EWC moving towards 
becoming a ‘project-oriented’ EWC.
‘This time they’ve taken a different approach. The management told us “Look, 
today we come with information, next month there will be a second meeting 
where we will answer your questions and within two months a third meeting to 
hear your advice.”’ (Trade union coordinator C)
3.1.4. European Works Council D
EWC D is the EWC of a Belgian multinational company and has 24 employee 
representatives. It meets once a year. Because it was established in 1995, 
EWC D functions under an Article 13 agreement which means that, unlike the 
previously-discussed EWCs, it does not have to comply with Directive 94/45/EC. 
Such agreements are called ‘voluntary agreements’ (Blanpain 2002). However, a 
comparison of the EWC agreements shows no significant differences. Moreover, 
the EWC D agreement includes more detailed terms, such as the purpose and 
mission of the select committee and the employee representatives’ duty to 
inform the workforce. Furthermore, EWC D has a select committee similar to the 
select committee of B which is very active and meets once per month. Employee 
representative 2D takes up the role of secretary in this select committee. In order to 
develop a comparison with the select committee of EWC B, the EWC for company 
D and its select committee are also analysed separately.
In contrast to the practices of the other EWCs on information and consultation, 
EWC D is often informed in a timely manner and has an effective consultation 
procedure. In most cases, the decision has been made, but there is still sufficient 
room for manoeuvre for the EWC to make suggestions. Interviewees gave the 
example of good practice when a reorganisation had been announced:
‘The presentation was 150 pages of information which we received before the 
meeting. So then we had the meeting; two days on this subject alone. We got 
detailed information on what they proposed to do. Then we had three months 
for consultation. Three months later was our plenary meeting and then we 
gave our feedback.’ (Employee representative 2D)
EWC D is thus informed early enough for there to be proper consultation. 
Management listens carefully to the opinion of the EWC, although both parties do 
not always agree and thus debate may occur. Despite certain discussions, the EWC 
and management maintain an open and transparent relationship.
‘They listen carefully. See, you will never change a whole decision. (…) But we 
have a big influence and thus we can also help the management. Sometimes 
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they make decisions and are not sure whether it will go in the right direction. 
Therefore we are helpful to give them feedback on what people are thinking.’ 
(Employee representative 2D)
In another example, management delayed the deadline for the implementation 
of a decision in order to make sure the EWC had sufficient time to consult and 
propose solutions, and for these then to be executed. 
In the past, this early information and effective consultation had not always 
been the case. Over time, this process of information and consultation has been 
improved especially through improved cooperation with the select committee. 
This committee meets once per month and thus receives more frequently updated 
information about the day-to-day management of the company. The EWC used to 
have the impression that information got stuck with the select committee. Now, 
information is shared in a timely fashion and management takes consultation 
more seriously. After the select committee sits down with management, they 
organise a teleconference with the EWC to keep the members up to date.
 ‘This communication process is evolving positively because now we know a lot 
more (…) Before that, it [the relationship between management and the select 
committee] was too closed. We had the impression that there was information 
that passed between the management and the select committee and then it 
stayed there. (…) Now we have a monthly telephone meeting between the 
select committee and the other EWC members.’ (Employee representative 1D)
Up until now, there was no trade union coordinator present in the EWC. This 
will change in subsequent meetings as a trade union coordinator for EWC D has 
been appointed. However, the EWC seems to be an active instrument: it publishes 
reports and presentations for local communication on intranet or team sites, 
issues concerning particular locations are addressed by working groups and local 
information is shared internally among representatives.
‘When organisation D decides to sell an activity, all the sites concerned 
are represented on a working group which meets every two months. (...) 
Representatives and management meet to give an update on the problems and 
sometimes they discuss possible solutions.’ (Employee representative 1D)
Furthermore, besides the EWC, a global forum under a global framework 
agreement has also been established regarding transnational topics outside 
Europe. In this respect, the EWC can be defined as a ‘project-oriented’ EWC. 
An important remark is that solidarity and internal operation between the 
representatives of different countries, especially those without a tradition of social 
dialogue, could be better. Most of the employee representatives are only interested 
in cases which concern their local site. Therefore, employee representative 1D 
believes EWC D could be more active than it currently is. However, the EWC has 
tried to tackle this by organising a team building event once per year.
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In the select committee, information and consultation are at such level that not 
only the committee is informed and consulted in a timely way, but it also tries to 
devise solutions together with management. One example was given by employee 
representative 2D who spoke of redundancies which they tried to avoid by 
investigating alternatives such as retirement, rotation or jobs on other sites.
‘In this case we worked together with the management to find a solution.’ 
(Employee representative 2D)
The relationship between the select committee and management is thus not only 
a transparent one but, moreover, it is one founded on trust between both parties. 
Therefore, we could define this select committee as somewhere between a ‘project-
oriented’ and a ‘participatory’ type.
Table 3 lists the EWCs by type.







Internal operation  
EWC
EWC type
EWC A Late & minimal Active role Low trust Information is spread locally 
through reports
Service provider
EWC B Late & minimal Passive role Low trust Information is spread locally 
through reports
SC takes over aspects of EWC 
role
Symbolic EWC
SC B Early & effective Passive role High trust Active and assertive Project-oriented SC
EWC C Late & minimal Active role Low trust Information is spread locally 
through reports
Online communications forum 
for EWC members
Service provider








3.2. Confidentiality and the withholding of information
Confidentiality can be defined both from a legal as well as a practical perspective. 
Generally, confidential information can be understood as information that is 
not publicly available and that confers a competitive advantage to the bodies 
that possess it (Hannah and Robertson 2015). This implies, therefore, all the 
information that has a certain level of sensitivity and where access to it is controlled 
or limited. 
Legally, confidentiality is regulated by Article 8 of EWC Directive 2009/38/EC. 
Here, a distinction is made between confidentiality (see point 1 in the box below) 
and the withholding of information (point 2). Confidentiality refers to information 
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disclosed to the EWC which cannot be revealed to employees; withheld information 
indicates the right of management to hold back information that could seriously 
damage the company if leaked. The Directive does leave room for EWCs to specify 
and interpret the notion of confidentiality in their individual agreements, which 
leads to significant variations in the definitions (Teissier 2016).
Box 1  EWC Directive 2009/38/EC: Article 8 on confidential information
1. Member States shall provide that members of special negotiating bodies or of European Works Councils and 
any experts who assist them are not authorized to reveal any information which has expressly been provided 
to them in confidence. […]
2. Each Member State shall provide, in specific cases and under the conditions and limits laid down by national 
legislation, that the central management situated in its territory is not obliged to transmit information when its 
nature is such that, according to objective criteria, it would seriously harm the functioning of the undertakings 
concerned or would be prejudicial to them.
From a practical perspective, we should approach confidentiality by questioning its 
level of legitimacy: is the use of this ‘confidentiality’ label justified or unjustified? 
An EWC with a high level of confidentiality could potentially be better performing 
than an EWC with a low level of confidentiality if it means that management is 
informing and consulting the EWC early in the decision-making process, and thus 
treating it as an insider or cooperation partner. In this case, confidentiality would 
be legitimate. This distinction between legitimate and illegitimate confidentiality 
is based on empirical studies on the experiences of employee representatives.
In more concrete terms, we consider confidentiality to be legitimate when 
information is provided in a timely manner but where it has a sensitive nature. In 
this situation, management has the right to consider information as confidential. 
Examples of legitimate confidential information can be personal issues, mergers 
or restructurings, stock market regulations, financial information, trends in 
employment, transfers of production, cutbacks, closures of undertakings, etc. 
(Waddington 2003). If the use of legitimate confidentiality can lead to early 
information and consultation for the EWC, this could potentially have a positive 
effect on its operation. 
In contrast, we consider confidentiality to be illegitimate when information is 
disclosed late to the EWC and/or it has no sensitive nature. Here, the management 
has no right to prevent the EWC informing employees.
This differentiation between the legitimate and illegitimate use of confidentiality 
requirements shows the close relationship between the issue of confidentiality 
and the timing of employee information and consultation. The more detailed 
the information and the earlier the consultation happens in the decision-making 
process, the more that confidentiality can be a legitimate requirement.
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3.2.1. European Works Council A
Confidentiality is, notably, something that is only imposed before meetings in EWC 
A. Two weeks before the meeting, the necessary documents are provided to the 
representatives with most of the information in them being embargoed, meaning 
it should be treated as confidential and cannot be shared. This confidentiality can 
be lifted with the permission of management but is otherwise lifted the day after 
the EWC meeting, except for some economic and financial figures which remain 
under embargo. Pre-meeting confidentiality is often perceived as unjustified 
because it concerns all information, including that which is not sensitive at all. We 
can thus speak of an ‘illegitimate confidentiality’ in this case.
The fact that there is free access to almost all information after the meeting is 
well received by employee representatives but there is, nevertheless, a feeling 
that management does withhold information from the EWC. Information of 
real significance is only shared at the very last moment. As a result, employee 
representatives’ advice and opinions no longer matter, as the decision has already 
been taken.
In summary, before the meeting everything is marked as confidential, even though 
the information is hardly sensitive; while, after it, almost nothing is confidential. 
The confidentiality issue in EWC A is, therefore, very ambiguous:
‘The most ideal process would be that we receive information under confiden-
tiality and that we could have influence as an EWC. But this isn’t the case. (…) 
We don’t have the trust of the management to fully implement this process. (…) 
This trust should be there, but it isn’t.’ (Employee representative 2A)
‘At the very last moment all of a sudden you receive some information. If 
they can keep it secret, it [information] is only at the very last moment. This 
doesn’t always work. Sometimes we catch rumours in advance.’ (Employee 
representative 1A)
3.2.2. European Works Council B
Confidentiality features at three different levels here: at the level of the EWC; at 
the level of the select committee; and at the individual level. 
At the level of the EWC, the problem is mostly related to management’s withholding 
of information. The information the EWC receives often arrives after a decision 
has been taken and thus cannot legitimately be considered confidential. So, on the 
one hand, very sensitive information is withheld and is only revealed to the EWC 
at the very last moment. On the other hand, all the information that the EWC 
does receive is incorrectly labelled as confidential, which we define as illegitimate. 
This complicates the role of the employee representatives in giving advice and 
opinions on the topics coming before the EWC and such practices are, thus, often 
challenged by EWC members:
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‘Before every EWC, we get slides with all the information. Sometimes these 
slides include “confidential” at the bottom of every page. Then we say, “Ok, 
but this is not confidential information, why does it say so?” The only answer 
we get is that it’s been copied and pasted. These are practices that shouldn’t be 
possible.’ (Employee representative 1B)
At the level of the select committee, however, it is mainly the issue of confidentiality 
(and thus not the withholding of information) which plays the key role. Unlike with 
the EWC, management does share sensitive information with the select committee 
while requiring that this remains confidential. However, this goes against the 
duty of select committee members to share information with, first, the EWC 
members and, second, employees. The select committee members then need to 
consider carefully which information they should or should not share, particularly 
because they are sometimes consulted before the employee representatives of the 
concerned country are informed:
‘We [select committee members] often have a large problem when they 
[the management] say, “This, you can’t share with anybody.” (…) We can’t 
communicate this, because in fact we would have to share it with all members. 
All 24-25 members. Then they need to keep it confidential too. That’s a difficult 
exercise.’ (Employee representative 2B)
How should we define this confidentiality? On the one hand, the information 
committee members receive is truly sensitive and is being communicated early 
to them. On the other hand, the select committee should not be prohibited from 
communicating this kind of information to the EWC. Therefore, we define this 
confidentiality as legitimate as regards employees but as illegitimate as regards 
other members of the EWC.
The Belgian representatives are also confronted with the confidentiality question 
at an individual level. They are located near the company management, and 
a relationship of trust exists between the Belgian representatives and Belgian 
senior management which means they sometimes get hold of information which 
they cannot share even with the select committee. They often demand to do 
so but, again, need to consider the merits of this. In such cases, the employee 
representatives seek support and advice from each other:
‘Some stuff is too heavy. (…) It’s really a ball that you need to keep pushing 
under the water. At the start that’s ok, but after some days it wants to come 
to the surface and your muscles can’t hold it. You have to tell it to someone.’ 
(Employee representative 2B)
Here, the fields of interaction between EWC and the management and the EWC 
internally are clear: management only informs the EWC when a decision is already 
being implemented; but, on the other hand, fully informs and consults the select 
committee. Therefore, the select committee is taking over the role of the EWC, 
which is leading to some ambiguous relations within the EWC. This can also partly 
be explained by the interaction between the EWC and the trade union, as we can 
see that the trade union coordinator of EWC B clearly takes up a less active role 
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than coordinators in other EWCs: he does not always attend meetings, despite 
employee representatives indicating their need for guidance, explaining this by 
pointing out the assertive attitude of the select committee.
3.2.3. European Works Council C
This EWC faces relatively high levels of demand for confidentiality. Management 
sends out the agenda and the necessary documents one month before the 
meeting, but all the information must remain confidential, as in EWC A. 
Following the meeting, the representatives need to keep everything confidential 
until the publication of the minutes, about one month later. The employee 
representatives state that, for some parts of the information, the confidentiality 
label is ‘absurd’. They do not have the feeling that they are being given particularly 
sensitive information and, in any case, the information tends to come very late. 
Consequently, we define such labelling as illegitimate. Respondents repeatedly 
mentioned the controlling approach of the American management when trying 
to justify this high level of withheld information and information being wrongly 
labelled as ‘confidential’.
‘Everything was confidential. We had really restricted that in the agreement 
and thought: “Ok, now we have a workable modus operandi.” And then in 
the first EWC meeting they came with an information package. One package 
with all the documents and PowerPoints, and one cover page saying: “Because 
this package contains confidential information, all information should be 
considered as confidential.” This was, in my view, another way of trying to keep 
control.’ (Trade union coordinator C)
3.2.4. European Works Council D
In contrast with the confidentiality practices in the cases of EWCs A, B and 
C, employee representatives in EWC D are rarely confronted with major 
confidentiality issues. The overall image shows a low level of confidentiality 
which means that, during most meetings, management does not request that 
information be kept back. Generally, most information could be communicated 
to local employee representatives after the plenary meeting. As mentioned in the 
above example, during a reorganisation the EWC had three months in which to 
formulate its advice. In this period, the members of the EWC were even able to 
discuss this information and prepare feedback in conjunction with local employee 
representatives. 
However, some information or events are too sensitive to be disclosed directly 
after a meeting. On these topics, confidentiality is invoked. In the experience of 
employee representative 1D, these confidential subjects mainly include stock 
market and financial information and production numbers. Additionally, in the 
event that the EWC receives early information (for example by asking questions) 
on divestments, redundancies or mergers, these topics are also considered 
confidential at this early stage as they could lead to unrest among workers. We 
would define such requests for confidentiality as legitimate as the information is 
of a sensitive nature. 
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‘When you ask further questions “Why this and why that,” here management 
says “Okay yes, we’ll tell you but this you have to keep quiet.”’ (Employee 
representative 1D)
Confidentiality issues in the select committee are, moreover, similar to those 
for the EWC. For important events such as divestments and mergers, the select 
committee is often informed a week earlier than the EWC, but never significantly 
earlier. In such cases, it tries to organise an extraordinary meeting as quickly as 
possible. For proposals which concern only one particular site it is also the case 
that the select committee is informed first. The withholding of information by 
management is not the experience of EWC D or its select committee. Furthermore, 
because management trusts the members of the select committee, restrictions are 
not imposed on with whom they can discuss these matters. Therefore, the select 
committee often discusses such subjects with trade union actors. As information is 
sensitive and does not come significantly earlier than in the EWC, we would define 
this confidentiality as legitimate.
‘They [the management] don’t tell us what to do or what not to discuss. They 
trust us. (…) But we do it [discuss matters with trade unions] in the case that we 
know they [trade union] will keep it confidential. (…) You need trust between 
people you’re talking with. Otherwise you will never receive confidential 
information.’ (Employee representative 2D)
3.2.5.  Summary
In theory, there should be a trade-off between getting timely (and thus more 
sensitive) information and being limited in ability to communicate about it by 
confidentiality rules. Where no sensitive information is given, confidentiality 
should not be an issue. Where more sensitive information is given, confidentiality 
could play a larger role. In Figure 1, which presents a typology created from the 
results of our interviews, we illustrate this trade-off using two axes. The vertical 
axis runs from receiving information early to receiving it very late; while the 
horizontal one runs from being bound by confidentiality restrictions to not being 
bound. As such, four ideal-type situations are possible:
Quadrant 1: legitimate confidentiality and late information and consultation. 
This quadrant reflects the situation where the EWC is only informed once 
decisions are taken and is not consulted. In terms of confidentiality, it is free to 
communicate about topics which are no longer considered sensitive.
Quadrant 2: illegitimate confidentiality and late information and consultation. 
This quadrant reflects the situation in which the EWC is informed late about 
decisions taken but is still restricted in its ability to communicate about 
the information received. This quadrant thus reflects the unjustified use of 
confidentiality rules by management, as even non-sensitive information is 
treated as sensitive.
Quadrant 3: illegitimate confidentiality and early information and consultation. 
This quadrant reflects the situation where the EWC is informed about planned 
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projects and is properly consulted, but there is still an unjustified use of 
confidentiality rules. This can occur when information is only shared with a 
selection of the EWC’s members (the select committee) or cannot be distributed 
to, for example, the other members of the EWC, local works councils, experts 
and trade unions supporting the EWC.
Quadrant 4: legitimate confidentiality and early information and consultation. 
This quadrant reflects a situation in which the EWC receives information early, 
it is consulted effectively and information is correctly labelled as confidential. 
The employee representatives have the possibility to share their views but are, 
in some cases, required to keep information confidential until the decision is 
final. This quadrant thus represents a justified use of confidentiality rules.
Figure 1  Information, consultation and confidentiality
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3.3.  Handling confidentiality requirements 
Faced with confidential information, employee representatives and EWCs can 
react in different ways: they can accept confidentiality and keep the information 
secret; they can challenge the confidential nature of the information; or they can 
disclose the information, completely ignoring its confidentiality. Depending on 
the reaction, the effects of information being made confidential will differ: if an 
EWC is required to keep information secret all the time, tensions might develop 
in its relationship with the employees it represents; if it discloses information, 
this might jeopardise its relationship with the management (and possibly the jobs 
of the employee representatives). So, the way in which employee representatives 
treat confidential information will affect their work as representatives.
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A look at the literature on this subject reveals that the focus concerning the 
operations of EWCs tends to lie on the legal aspects of confidentiality, particularly 
the Directive of 1994 and its Recast in 2009. However, not much is to be found 
about confidentiality at the micro level, i.e. confidentiality issues in particular 
cases and how employee representatives cope with them. While confidentiality 
is often cited as an issue for EWCs, there is little research which has gone into 
more detail. The Lecher typology and other empirical literature give us some 
general ideas on which EWCs might face certain problems regarding confidential 
information and what those issues might be. It does not, however, tell us much 
about how employee representatives deal with confidentiality.
This is why we now turn to the industrial psychology literature, in which different 
theories have been developed on how individuals respond to information being 
labelled as confidential. De Dreu et al. (2001) distinguish between different 
handling strategies that can be adopted when facing a conflictual situation:
 – ‘problem solving’ involves taking into account the goals of the other party 
in order to come to a mutually beneficial solution. One example could be 
determining a deadline by which confidential information can be made 
public that satisfies the needs of both parties.
 – ‘accommodating’ involves giving in to the wishes of the other party. Here, 
this could mean an EWC accepting the confidentiality stipulation imposed 
(rightfully or not) by management. This is most common when one party 
expects the other to do something for them in return: for example, when 
employee representatives expect to receive more sensitive information 
from the management in exchange for their silence.
 – ‘avoiding’ involves moving away from the issue causing conflict and 
discussing other subjects. This could mean the EWC deciding not to discuss 
the issue any further.
 – ‘forcing’ involves confronting the other party directly and trying to impose 
one’s own view. Here, the EWC could challenge the confidential nature of 
the information and demand the freedom to communicate it.
 – ‘compromising’ involves seeking out mutual concessions to find a middle 
ground. In the EWC, management and employee representatives could 
decide on some information not being confidential and some retaining a 
confidential status.
The way in which EWCs and individual employee representatives cope with 
confidential information is evidently likely to affect their individual and collective 
performance. Indeed, keeping information secret from employees (thereby 
choosing an ‘avoiding’ or ‘accommodating’ strategy) might cause high levels of 
distress among EWC representatives and the team. A ‘forcing’ strategy, however, 
also has potential costs in terms of the mobilisation of resources and risking open 
conflict with the employer.
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Different external factors are likely to affect the choice of strategy. First, union 
support could stimulate employee representatives to adopt a more combative 
attitude towards management. Unions could provide representatives with legal 
advice, consultation and training in order to take up a stronger position in the EWC 
(Steiert 2001). This would encourage employee representatives to lean towards a 
‘forcing’ strategy (Elgoibar et al. 2013). In fact, works councils who experience a 
higher level of union support seem to perform better (Jirjahn et al. 2011).
Second, the industrial relations culture in particular countries also plays a role. 
How things are handled in the home country of an employee representative 
will also affect their desired handling strategy (Elgoibar et al. 2013). Employee 
representatives in some countries could adopt a rather conflictual, ‘forcing’ 
strategy while representatives of other countries are not used to negotiating with 
management. Determining a single, coherent strategy as an EWC could, therefore, 
be a difficult exercise. However, in order to establish the sort of effective EWC 
described by Lecher et al. as ‘participatory’, the EWC needs to develop its own 
collective identity (Stirling and Tully 2004). 
Third, the state of trust between employee representatives and management is a 
major factor. An established degree of trust between the EWC and management 
induces co-operation (Timming 2006) and thus could motivate the instigation of 
a collaborative strategy. However, a lack of trust is often recognised as a problem 
within EWCs. Therefore, ‘forcing’ strategies could be more effective. Despite the 
lack of trust within many EWCs, it is possible to establish long-term foundations 
of trust between management and individual employee representatives. In these 
cases, information is often exchanged through informal means, often ‘off the 
record’ and on a confidential basis (Elgoibar et al. 2013; Haynes and Allen 2001) 
– a ‘forcing’ strategy may, therefore, not be suitable in this kind of situation.
3.3.1.  European Works Council A
Employee representatives try to cope in different ways with the situation in which 
a lot of information is withheld and illegitimate pre-meeting confidentiality 
demands are made. First of all, they try to circumvent management and source 
information at a local level. As most employee representatives are also local 
representatives, they communicate any information that could be of relevance 
to the transnational level. This enables them to be informed about management 
plans even before they are officially announced in the EWC:
‘The presentation the management gives each year, that information I can also 
read on the intranet. But the contact with colleagues from other countries: that 
is important. Because you will learn more and you’ll be able to see through the 
story they tell you. (…) This mutual contact is the most important of the EWC.’ 
(Employee representative 2A)
Other than this, representatives try to reduce the pre-meeting confidential 
nature of information where they perceive it as unjustified. They do so by directly 
challenging management with their demands. For example, when, in one instance, 
the EWC did not get the required documents in time, it reacted as follows:
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‘They [the employee representatives] went to the meeting and said, “As we don’t 
have documents nor an agenda, we have nothing to discuss with you,” and they 
left the room. The employer was in shock. That started a conversation. After 
about ten select committee meetings, we’ve agreed that all documents should 
be sent at least 15 days before the meeting.’ (Union coordinator A)
Here, the EWC clearly adopted a ‘forcing’ strategy, prioritising the defence of its 
own interests. This, in turn, led to a compromise between the two parties. Such 
strategies are difficult to put into action, however. Employee representatives from 
countries with fewer employees, or who are not union members or even selected by 
management, often block such actions, tending to use a more ‘avoiding’ style. The 
union coordinator has suggested commencing court action against management 
several times on the grounds of the lack of timely information, but this has been 
met with doubts and a sense of reluctance among some EWC members.
Regarding other interactions than between the EWC and management, there is 
also internal cooperation between EWC members. Members try to engage in a 
more informal form of contact between each other in order to achieve a better 
information flow:
‘We receive more and quicker information through this way [informal contact 
between members]. (…) We are all allocated anywhere and everywhere (…) so 
that everyone knows something. In this way, we can gather information much 
faster.’ (Employee representative 1A)
However, the EWC is composed of representatives with very different backgrounds 
and many of them are not trade unionists. There is, therefore, a considerable 
diversity of opinion about how to respond. Information is shared freely inside the 
group, but developing a common approach is often difficult:
‘The atmosphere is very good. But making the step towards “Doing something 
against the management” is very difficult and illogical for some. (…) This 
diversity keeps us from acting and management uses that.’ (Employee 
representative 1A)
As for the question of interaction between the EWC and trade unions, the 
trade union coordinator plays an important role. In this company, employee 
representatives described this role as being an active one. She encourages the 
EWC to write reports, investigate cases of illegitimate confidentiality and consider 
how to deal with these situations:
‘[The trade union coordinator] has tried to encourage the EWC to go to the 
Belgian court to say that information and consultation at European level is not 
being respected.’ (Employee representative 1A)
In conclusion, EWC A is – as we have concluded – a ‘service provider’ EWC which 
faces a significant problem of management withholding information from it. On 
top of this, there is the illegitimate imposition of confidentiality before meetings 
and almost no confidentiality afterwards. The EWC has sought to cope with 
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this situation by building up alternative informal information networks and by 
challenging management on the late provision of information. These handling 
strategies have had a beneficial effect on the functioning of the EWC, but have 
also led to internal discussions that reveal different views on what further action 
to take. Also, such strategies have not resulted in the EWC being given more, or 
earlier, information in the long-term.
3.3.2.  European Works Council B
Employee representatives in EWC B have tried to battle with the problem of 
confidentiality at EWC, select committee and individual levels. The EWC has 
sought to challenge the illegitimately confidential nature of the information being 
provided by opening this issue up for discussion every time. They have done so 
in order to seek out compromise, always arguing that, for some information, 
they can accept confidentiality. The withholding of information by management, 
however, is a much larger problem and one that is also more difficult to address. 
This ‘compromising’/’forcing’ strategy has had some effect as, in recent meetings, 
management has tended to be more specific about what information is confidential 
instead of branding all information with this label.
At the level of the select committee, the handling mechanisms adopted by 
members are more complex. As they want to keep getting timely and quality 
information, they most often opt for an ‘accommodating’ strategy: for the most 
part, they do not challenge the confidential nature of the information in order to 
gain the confidence of management and guarantee that they will be informed and 
consulted in the future.
‘If we say that we are going to tell our members everything [in the EWC], they’ll 
also stop informing us. (…) It’s a very difficult deliberation. (…) Normally we 
have the right, or even the duty, to communicate everything. But if we do that 
every time we wouldn’t get any more information and they would decide stuff 
which we cannot influence any longer.’ (Employee representative 1B)
In conclusion, EWC B has a rather inactive ‘symbolic’ EWC with a very active 
‘project-oriented’ select committee. The EWC is frequently faced with information 
that is wrongly identified as confidential. It actively challenges management 
on this and tries to search for compromise. The select committee, on the other 
hand, has access to really sensitive information which it cannot share. This goes 
against its duty to inform colleagues. In order to maintain this early information 
and consultation, the select committee has therefore adopted an ‘accommodating’ 
strategy. While successful in retaining the trust of both the EWC and management, 
this situation clearly places strain on the individual employee representatives on 
the select committee.
3.3.3.  European Works Council C
In contrast to EWC A, pre-meeting confidentiality is rarely challenged in EWC 
C. During the meetings, however, the employee representatives often challenge 
the confidential nature of the information, but not in a ‘forcing’ way: they discuss 
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the issue with management and try to reach compromise in order to quicken the 
process of reporting back to employees. Often, the compromise is that only some 
pages and some information should remain confidential:
‘In these meetings we say, “Why is this labelled as confidential? This isn’t what 
we want! Employees can know this, right?” Sometimes they [management] 
reply by saying, “Okay, this part can be shared and this part can’t.”’ (Employee 
representative 1C)
Employee representatives also try to speed up the information process by 
exchanging information internally within the EWC. For this, they have established 
an online forum where they can communicate in order to prepare for meetings 
and share local information which is possibly interesting to other countries. 
If they detect a possible transnational issue, they put it on the agenda and ask 
management about it. In this way, they try to prevent management withholding 
information until after the decision is taken:
‘We have a group online with all the representatives on the EWC. (…) Sometimes 
a country says, “We received this information. Did you receive this news 
already? Shouldn’t we speak about this?” Then we try to put this on the agenda. 
(…) I think we receive more information from colleagues in other countries. (…) 
This can be sensitive information.’ (Employee representative 1C)
The handling strategies used clearly affect the EWC and the individual 
representatives. Challenging the confidential nature of the information might 
have contributed to the recent attitude shift of management and the more useful 
consultation process that has begun to take place. At the same time, it has caused 
a lot of frustration for employee representatives who feel that they have to play the 
same game over and over again:
‘You’ve got the feeling like, “We have to say this again? It’s already the third 
meeting and (…) we told them last meeting that we don’t accept that cover page 
[which says that all information is confidential]”. (…) It is frustrating.’ (Union 
coordinator C)
In this EWC, the focus also lies on the fields of interaction between the EWC 
and the management, the EWC internally and between the EWC and the trade 
union. As mentioned earlier, management provides the EWC with information 
which is labelled as confidential – but illegitimately so, due to the late timing and 
non-sensitive content – and, in response, the members of the EWC have tried to 
strengthen the informal contact network by establishing an online forum in order 
to create an improved flow of information. The role of the trade union coordinator 
is similar to that of the coordinator in A; he plays an active and leading role in the 
EWC, which could be one of the reasons why members were properly informed 
and consulted at the most recent EWC meeting.
In conclusion, EWC C is a ‘service provider’ EWC, but with the potential to become 
more ‘project-oriented’ in the future. It faces problems of late information and 
little consultation. Confidentiality levels are high before the meeting and remain 
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in place for a while afterwards. The confidentiality label is generally perceived as 
illegitimate and challenged by employee representatives but via a ‘compromising’ 
approach. This increases the effectiveness of the EWC but also results in frustration 
at an individual level. However, in the light of the changed structure at the last 
meeting – with employee representatives receiving information in time and proper 
consultation – there is hope for an evolution towards a more active type of EWC.
3.3.4.  European Works Council D
EWC D is not usually confronted with significant confidentiality issues and 
information is legitimately labelled as confidential so employee representatives, 
generally, respect it. In contrast to the members of other EWCs, they do not 
challenge the confidential nature of information in order to communicate faster to 
the workforce. They use an ‘accommodating’ strategy to be consulted properly and 
because, in most cases, they believe that confidentiality is justified.  
Furthermore, members of the select committee uses the same ‘accommodating’ 
strategy. On important matters (such as divestments, mergers, etc.), they do not 
disclose confidential information either to the workforce or to the EWC, as the 
EWC receives this information shortly after. 
‘Sometimes we [the select committee] are informed about the divestment of 
a small site. And then we are informed about one week before. And then we 
say, “Okay, we keep this confidential until the announcement appears.” (…) 
But these topics are for the whole EWC so then we organise an extraordinary 
meeting.’ (Employee representative 2D)
In this period in which only the members of the select committee have the 
information, they try to look for actions and possible solutions, list their questions 
and take the first steps in organising working groups in order to prepare for the 
EWC meeting and improve the consultation process.
‘We know that it’s confidential and we keep it to ourselves, but informally we 
discuss the next steps on how we proceed: what can we do to help employees if 
they are concerned?’ (Employee representative 2D)
In the case of EWC D, the focus lies particularly on the interrelationship between 
the EWC, the select committee and management. The EWC and management 
have an open and transparent relationship. This transparency stems mainly 
from the relationship of trust that the select committee has established with the 
management and which the committee ensures is pulled through to the EWC. As 
employee representative 2D states: ‘Trust is key in cooperating’. By building upon 
critical moments, the select committee (and the EWC) have shown strength as an 
instrument of consultation. 
‘And there [one critical moment in company D] the management has seen 
that employee representatives are much more for companies than just 
representatives of employees. We are ambassadors of the company. This led 
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to a huge turn. From this time on, we [management and EWC] have worked 
really well together.’ (Employee representative 2D)
Trust might well be established between the select committee and management, 
but the committee sometimes deviates from its ‘accommodating’ strategy as 
it occasionally confides in the trade union by disclosing certain confidential 
information.
‘They [the management] don’t tell us what to do or what not to discuss. They 
trust us. (…) But we do it [discuss matters with trade unions] where we know 
they [the trade union] will keep it confidential. (…) You need trust between 
people you’re talking with. Otherwise you will never receive confidential 
information.’ (Employee representative 2D)
In conclusion, we have defined EWC D as a ‘project-oriented’ EWC as it receives 
timely information and is properly consulted. Despite some internal malfunctions, 
such as a lack of solidarity, the EWC takes various actions to support local 
communication. Since it is not confronted with major confidentiality issues and 
information is legitimately labelled as confidential, the members deal with this in 
an ‘accommodating’ way. Furthermore, the EWC is supported by a very active select 
committee which shares information with the EWC by organising teleconferences. 
This select committee can be situated somewhere between a ‘project-oriented’ and 
a ‘participatory’ type, in which trust and cooperation are well established. This is 
the line it tries to extend to the wider EWC.
3.3.5. Summary
Figure 2  Information, consultation, confidentiality and handling strategies
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Figure 2 shows the handling strategies for each EWC and the implications these 
have for the quadrants in which the EWCs are situated. EWCs A, B and C fit into 
Quadrant 2, where they get little (and surely not sensitive) information but are still 
bound by confidentiality requirements. They deal with this situation through a mix 
of ‘forcing’ and ‘compromising’ strategies as a means of successfully challenging 
the confidentiality requirement. Through ‘active coping’ (i.e. adopting ‘forcing’ 
and ‘compromising’ strategies), EWCs A, B and C can reduce the confidentiality 
requirements facing their EWC. This could be considered an improvement in how 
the EWC functions as, in this way, members can at least talk about the information 
they receive, despite it arriving late. However, these handling strategies have not, 
unfortunately, pushed management to share information earlier and engage in a 
real consultation process. 
The select committee of EWC B, however, is located in Quadrant 3 (early 
information and consultation but illegitimate confidentiality). 
EWC D and its select committee are located in Quadrant 4 where, as with the 
select committee in EWC B, they enjoy maximum information and consultation, 
with confidentiality requirements being justified. Both organisations in case D and 
the select committee for EWC B deal with the confidentiality issue by adopting 
an ‘accommodating’ strategy. However, what is the difference between these two 
cases such that EWC B is confronted with illegitimate confidentiality requirements 
whereas D is not?
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4. Cross case analysis and development  
 of hypotheses
This section of the working paper compares the four case studies in a cross-case 
analysis. To facilitate this, Table 4 provides a summary of the four cases. In this 
section, we also develop some hypotheses which will, in the next part, be cross-
checked with information from the survey results. 
As we can see from the cross-case comparative schematic presentation in Table 4, 
three cases (A, B and C), remarkably, face more or less the same problems in the 
information and consultation process. These three EWCs receive information late 
and are not really consulted on forthcoming decisions. Here, the select committee 
of EWC B and case D (both EWC and select committee) form exceptions as they 
have access to timely information and are properly consulted. 
These results (unfortunately) are in line with many other studies that have 
identified deficiencies in EWCs (Pulignano and Turk 2016; Waddington 
2011). Additionally, in the already-published results of the 2018 survey, only a 
minority of EWC representatives stated that they received information or were 
consulted before the final decisions were taken on a matter (De Spiegelaere 
and Jagodziński 2019). Regarding managements withholding information, 
therefore, the following is hypothesised:
Hypothesis 1a: Most EWC representatives agree that management 
withholds information from them.
Hypothesis 1b: Select committee members are less likely to agree 
that management withholds information from them.
Not only are most EWCs informed at a very late stage and improperly consulted, 
management also tags a lot of information as confidential; if information was 
provided earlier in the process, this confidentiality would be more readily 
accepted. However, in cases A, B and C, management applies confidentiality 
rules to virtually all the information provided up to the date of the meeting 
and, sometimes, even long afterwards. We therefore propose the following 
hypotheses:
Hypothesis 2a: Most EWC representatives agree that they feel 
limited in discussing issues due to confidentiality concerns.
Hypothesis 2b: EWC members who think management withholds 
information will also be more likely to feel limited in talking about 
issues in the EWC due to confidentiality concerns.
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EWC representatives who are confronted with confidentiality requirements 
that they perceive as being illegitimate do challenge management on that 
score. They do so by seeking compromises (in all three cases) and, sometimes, 
also by forcing the issue (such as the walk-out in EWC A). 
Hypothesis 3a: Most EWC representatives will challenge 
management over what information is treated in a confidential way.
Hypothesis 3b: EWC members who feel management limits their 
freedom to talk about EWC issues will be more likely to challenge 
management over what should be considered as confidential.
Challenging management on the confidential nature of information, and 
seeking compromise, does have a somewhat positive effect. In cases A, B and C, 
management conceded by limiting confidentiality to a certain number of pages. 
However, the long-term effects are unclear. Despite being regularly challenged 
at annual meetings, this has not encouraged management to take a different 
and more open attitude in the long-term. Neither has it pushed management 
to provide information earlier and, therefore, it has not addressed the issue of 
the withholding of information. 
The select committee of EWC B and case D are in a very different situation: 
they do receive timely information which is often sensitive and thus, 
rightfully, marked as confidential. Employee representatives here cope in an 
‘accommodating’ way to retain management confidence. However, the select 
committee in D also tries to enhance the flow of communication with the EWC 
by organising monthly teleconferences to ensure sufficient reporting back to 
EWC members. 
Table 4 Comparative case study results
EWC type Confidentiality Withholding of information Handling strategy  
vis-à-vis management
EWC A Service provider Illegitimate pre-meeting confidentiality 
Legitimate post-meeting confidentiality
High level of information withholding Forcing, compromising
EWC B Symbolic Illegitimate confidentiality High level of information withholding Compromising
SC B Project-oriented Legitimate confidentiality regarding 
workforce 
Illegitimate confidentiality regarding 
EWC
No or low level of information withholding Accommodating
EWC C Service provider Illegitimate pre- and post-meeting 
confidentiality
High level of information withholding Compromising
EWC D Project-oriented Legitimate confidentiality No or low level of information withholding Accommodating
SC D Project-oriented 
/ Participatory
Legitimate confidentiality towards 
workforce and EWC
No or low level of information withholding Accommodating
In this research paper, different practices concerning information, consultation, 
(the legitimacy of) confidentiality, the withholding of information and various 
actions on how to deal with these practices have been brought forward. However, 
what is the reason for the existence of such differences in information, consultation 
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and, especially, confidentiality? How can we explain that EWCs A, B and C are 
confronted with late information, minimal consultation and an unjustified use of 
confidentiality while the select committee of B and case study D are informed in 
good time, consulted properly and under confidentiality rules that are legitimate 
(regarding the workforce) concerning the sensitivity of the information provided?
An explanation for this contrast could be found in the way that employee 
representatives interact with management, the handling strategies they adopt 
concerning confidentiality and the actions they initiate regarding information and 
consultation. Huzzard et al. (2004) distinguish two trade union strategies with 
which employee representatives can operate in interactions with management in 
bodies such as the EWC. The first of these is the ‘boxing’ strategy, which indicates 
the traditional, conflict-based approach used by unions; while the second, ‘dancing’, 
would appear in opposition to ‘boxing’. ‘Dancing’ focuses on formal cooperative 
processes between both parties, introducing management as a partner instead of 
a counterpart. This partnership builds on confidence between management and 
employee representatives (Haynes and Allen 2001; Van Klaveren and Sprenger 
2005). 
Analysing the cases using this framework, we could say that EWCs A, B and C 
tend towards an adversarial, ‘boxing’ strategy as they have rather active handling 
strategies with regard to the confidentiality issues, including ‘forcing’ and 
‘compromising’. We saw in Figure 2 that these sorts of active strategies could 
improve the functioning of an EWC, moving it from being confronted with 
illegitimate demands for confidentiality to a position where confidentiality was 
legitimate. Also, these EWCs (cases A and C) seem to operate internally rather well 
as they share information between each other to speed up the flow of information. 
Between the management and employee representatives of case D, a ‘dancing’ 
strategy based on partnership has been used. Management and the EWC, as 
well as the select committee, try to cooperate formally and facilitate an open and 
transparent relationship. Employee representatives deal in an ‘accommodating’ 
way with confidential information and, therefore, receive timely information and 
proper consultation. This ‘dancing’ strategy is built upon strong relations of trust 
between the select committee of EWC D and the management. In contrast with the 
select committee of EWC B, the select committee in EWC D does not tend to take 
on the role of the EWC; instead, it tries to pull the EWC along in this partnership 
strategy. The select committee seeks to do this by, on the one hand, lobbying 
management in order to be informed and consulted in a timely way; and, on the 
other, by stimulating cooperation with EWC members. 
It may also be the case that EWC members in D are less stimulated to take up an 
adversarial, ‘boxing’ strategy than other EWCs as there has, up to now, been no 
trade union coordinator present. 
By deploying this ‘dancing’ strategy, the EWC appears to receive timely information 
and proper consultation. The need for cooperation and trust in order to form an 
effective information and consultation procedure has also been stated by others 
(Kougiannou et al. 2019). Furthermore, a partnership-based ‘dancing’ strategy 
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could lead to a legitimate use of confidentiality as the management trusts the EWC 
with early and, thus, sensitive information. This could lead to an improvement in 
the functioning of EWCs. 
Based on this possible explanation, we further hypothesise that trust and a good 
social climate is likely to relate closely with: (1) whether information is shared; 
and (2) whether EWC representatives can freely communicate the information:
Hypothesis 4a: Those EWC representatives who see the social 
climate in the EWC as being hostile will be more likely to say 
management does not want to share information.
Hypothesis 4b: Those EWC representatives who see the social 
climate in the EWC as being hostile will be more likely to say they feel 
limited in talking about EWC matters due to confidentiality concerns.
One factor stimulating an active handling scenario, mentioned by EWCs A and C, 
is the presence of an external trade union coordinator. We have already discussed 
that union support could stimulate employee representatives to adopt a more 
combative attitude towards management (Steiert 2001). This would encourage 
employee representatives to lean towards a ‘forcing’ strategy.
‘Thanks to the training of our union coordinator we could form a more 
active EWC and that’s really important. (…) Without him we would 
never have got so far, I think.’ (Employee representative 1C)
‘I have a mandate to make the voice of the union be heard, but also for 
guidance and to make sure that this group of employee representatives 
cooperates and, if needed, receives legal advice. But it really depends 
on the coherence of the group. (…) I’m not connected to the company 
and so I try to give input on how to work on this, drawing from my own 
experience with other EWCs.’ (Union coordinator A)
Interviews highlighted that the strong guidance of the trade union coordinator 
has a positive impact on the functioning of EWCs. For example, at the request 
of coordinators, reports have been written autonomously and independently of 
management, while the coordinators have also stimulated EWCs to react more 
proactively to management statements and the possible abuse of confidentiality 
labels on information. These findings are in line with results concerning union 
support in the studies published by Elgoibar et al. (2013), Steiert (2001) and 
Jirjahn et al. (2011). We mentioned earlier that the trade union coordinator in 
EWC B took a less guiding position vis-à-vis the EWC because of the assertive and 
active attitude of the select committee, with the result that EWC B is defined as 
more passive than the other EWCs. 
Hypothesis 5: Those EWC representatives who have the support of a 
trade union coordinator will be more likely to challenge management 
over what information is confidential. 
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5. Quantitative insights from the EWC  
 survey
From the case studies, a series of patterns have been observed and we have developed 
hypotheses in response. In the following section, we will use data from a large-scale 
survey of EWC representatives to assess these hypotheses. Further information 
on this survey can be found in the recent publication entitled ‘Can anybody hear 
us? An overview of the 2018 survey of EWC and SEWC representatives’ (De 
Spiegelaere and Jagodziński 2019). The figures here are based on the responses of 
1,635 EWC and SEWC respondents, weighted to reflect the population based on 
country of origin, sector of activity and whether the respondent was active in an 
EWC or in a SEWC. In this paper, as in the original report, we are citing the views 
of a sample of respondents, scaled to be representative, i.e. the percentages refer 
to people in EWCs and SEWCs; they do not refer to EWCs.
As a reminder, we repeat our hypotheses here:
 – H1a: Most EWC representatives agree that management withholds infor-
mation from them.
 – H1b: Select committee members are less likely to agree that management 
withholds information from them.
 – H2a: Most EWC representatives agree that they feel limited in discussing 
issues due to confidentiality concerns.
 – H2b: EWC members who say management withholds information will also 
be more likely to feel limited in talking about issues in the EWC due to 
confidentiality concerns.
 – H3a: Most EWC representatives will challenge management over what 
information is to be treated in a confidential way.
 – H3b: EWC members who feel management limits their freedom to talk 
about EWC issues will be more likely to challenge management over what 
should be considered as confidential.
 – H4a: Those EWC representatives who see the social climate in the EWC as 
being hostile will be more likely to say management does not want to share 
information.
 – H4b: Those EWC representatives who see the social climate in the EWC 
as being hostile will be more likely to say they feel limited in talking about 
EWC matters due to confidentiality concerns.
 – H5: Those EWC representatives who have the support of a trade union 
coordinator will be more likely to challenge management over what 
information is confidential. 
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We start by looking at the overall responses of EWC representatives on the three 
questions related to: (1) management withholding information; (2) representatives 
feeling limited in talking about EWC issues because of confidentiality concerns; 
and (3) representatives challenging management over what information is 
confidential. The results on these questions are provided in Table 5 and allow us 
to address hypotheses 1a, 2a and 3a.
We observed that, in three out of the four case studies, management frequently 
refused to provide information on the grounds of confidentiality and that most 
representatives felt limited in talking about EWC issues because of confidentiality 
concerns. Looking at the general survey results, we find that 39.4 per cent of EWC 
representatives agree (‘totally agree’ and ‘agree’ combined) that their management 
withholds information on confidentiality grounds, while 33.7 per cent of EWC rep-
resentatives agree that they feel limited in talking about EWC issues as a result of 
confidentiality concerns. In both cases, a considerable proportion of EWC repre-
sentatives (respectively, 23.6 per cent and 21.7 per cent) adopts a neutral position. 
Based on these results, we cannot confirm hypotheses 1a or 2a, as most EWC 
representatives disagree with the statement or remain neutral on it. Obviously, four 
case studies, of which two were sampled specifically on the grounds that they had 
issues regarding confidentiality, do not necessarily deliver a representative picture 
of the wider population. Nevertheless, 39.4 per cent of representatives saying that 
their management withholds information is still a very considerable group.
Regarding hypothesis 3a, the situation is a little more complex. As can be observed, 
45.9 per cent of representatives agree that they often challenge management over 
what information is labelled confidential. This is remarkable as it shows that 
almost one-half of EWC members apparently quite often feel the need to disagree 
openly with management on what information is regarded as confidential.  
Table 5 Survey: withholding information, limited in talking and challenging
 Strongly 
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know
Management often refuses to give information on the grounds of 
confidentiality
14.0% 25.4% 23.6% 26.2% 7.2% 3.6%
I often feel limited in talking about my EWC work to the 
employees I represent because of concerns about confidentiality
8.9% 24.8% 21.7% 29.6% 11.1% 3.9%
Employee representatives often challenge management over 
what information is confidential. 
12.3% 33.6% 27.1% 17.2% 4.5% 5.3%
In the case studies, we observed that there were differences between ‘normal’ EWC 
members and those who were members of a select committee, and we therefore 
compare their survey answers in Table 6. This enables us to assess hypothesis 1b. 
The table differentiates the results between ‘office holders’, ‘normal members’ and 
‘substitute members’, with those in the ‘office holders’ group being EWC members 
that are also members of the select committee or who are presidents, chairs or 
secretaries of the EWC. Essentially, this groups all those EWC members that have 
an additional function within the EWC. The ‘normal’ group consists of all those 
EWC members who do not have an additional function, while the ‘substitute’ 
group comprises all deputy members, or replacement or substitute members. 
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Focusing first on whether management ‘often’ refuses to share information, we 
observe that substitute members are the most likely to agree with this statement. It 
may be that their distance from the work of the EWC accounts for this. Comparing 
office holders with normal members, the pattern is not so clear. Office holders seem 
to disagree more than normal members (41.4 per cent vs. 30.3 per cent); yet, at the 
same time, the percentage that strongly agrees with the statement is slightly higher 
among office members (15.5 per cent vs. 12.8 per cent). Hypothesis 1b stated that 
select committee members would be less likely to agree that management refuses 
to share information. This seems to be correct, yet it is more the case that they are 
much more likely to disagree, although there is a small group which agrees more 
strongly. It is most likely that being a select committee member gives earlier and 
better access to information, but it can also create more frustration if information 
is not forthcoming.
We did not draft hypotheses on the relationship between the function of the EWC 
member and (1) them feeling limited in talking about EWC matters; or (2) them 
challenging management. Nevertheless, we can observe some interesting patterns. 
In general, office holders take a neutral position less frequently than normal 
and substitute members. Regarding feeling limited in talking about issues, this 
translates into office holders both agreeing more often to this statement and also 
disagreeing more often. It is the proportion that strongly disagrees (15 per cent 
vs. 8.8 per cent) that is most remarkable. Regarding the question on challenging 
management, the differences are clearly less marked but follow the same trend. 
Table 6 Withholding, limited and challenging – by function
 Strongly 
agree
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know chi-square 
p-value
 Management often refuses to give information on the grounds of confidentiality <0.01
Total 14.0% 25.4% 23.6% 26.2% 7.2% 3.6%
Office holders 15.5% 20.9% 21.1% 33.2% 8.2% 1.1%
Normal members 12.8% 27.1% 25.8% 23.8% 6.5% 4.1%
Substitute 
members
15.8% 34.8% 19.1% 13.8% 6.3% 10.3%
 I often feel limited in talking about my EWC work to the employees I represent because of concerns about 
confidentiality
<0.01
Total 8.9% 24.8% 21.7% 29.6% 11.1% 3.9%
Office holders 9.8% 26.8% 16.4% 30.7% 15.0% 1.2%
Normal members 8.2% 24.2% 24.8% 29.1% 8.8% 4.9%
Substitute 
members
9.4% 22.8% 20.5% 27.0% 10.8% 9.4%
 Employee representatives often challenge management over what information is confidential 0.02
Total 12.3% 33.6% 27.1% 17.2% 4.5% 5.3%
Office holders 13.5% 38.0% 22.7% 18.5% 5.2% 2.1%
Normal members 12.0% 31.3% 30.0% 16.1% 4.1% 6.5%
Substitute 
members
9.9% 31.4% 24.3% 20.0% 2.8% 11.5%  
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We focus next on the interrelationships between the three questions regarding 
confidentiality. Based on the case studies, we hypothesised that: EWC members 
who think management withholds information will be more likely to feel limited 
in talking about their EWC work (2b); and that EWC members who feel limited in 
talking about their EWC work will be more likely to challenge management over 
what information is confidential (3b).
For the sake of comparability, we have grouped the two shades of agreement and 
the two shades of disagreement on the various questions and eliminated those 
who answered ‘don’t know’. The results are given in Table 7.
This table shows that, indeed, among representatives who think management 
‘often’ refuses to provide information, over one-half also agree that they feel 
limited in talking about the work of the EWC due to confidentiality concerns. Of 
those who are neutral or disagree that management withholds information, fewer 
than one in four say they feel limited in talking about the EWC’s work. Obviously, 
hypothesis 2b is confirmed and, furthermore, what is observed in the case studies 
can be observed in the general population: management withholding information 
goes together with high confidentiality requirements and EWC members feeling 
limited in talking about their EWC work. This is indeed paradoxical because, if 
management is highly selective about which information they share, one might 
expect that the information they do share is not going to be confidential in any way. 
Hypothesis 3b is also confirmed as those EWC representatives who feel limited 
in talking about their EWC work are also much more likely to say they challenge 
management over what information is and is not confidential (73.5 per cent agree 
vs. less than 40 per cent who are neutral or who disagree). Additionally, we can 
observe the same relationship where management withholds information: EWC 
members who think management withholds information are more likely to agree 
that they challenge management over what information is regarded as confidential 
(64.8 per cent agree vs. 42 per cent or less who are neutral or who disagree). 
Table 7 Interrelationships
 Limited in talking chi-square p-value
Withholding information Agree Neutral Disagree <0.01
Agree 51.1% 19.4% 29.6%
Neutral 23.4% 39.8% 36.8%
Disagree 24.1% 15.4% 60.5%
Challenging management chi-square p-value
Withholding information Agree Neutral Disagree <0.01
Agree 64.8% 22.3% 12.9%  
Neutral 41.6% 44.6% 13.8%
Disagree 33.5% 25.7% 40.8%  
Challenging management chi-square p-value
Limited in talking Agree Neutral Disagree  <0.01
Agree 73.5% 17.2% 9.3%
Neutral 39.5% 49.7% 10.8%
Disagree 31.8% 27.5% 40.7%  
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Regarding challenges to management, the case studies also observed that the 
presence of a trade union coordinator plays an important role (hypothesis 5). To 
assess this, Table 8 shows answers to the ‘challenge’ question, split into those who 
have and those who do not have a trade union coordinator. The results show that 
EWC representatives who say they have the support of a trade union coordinator 
are (a little) more likely to say they ‘often’ challenge management over what 
information is confidential (48.7 per cent among those who have a co-ordinator 
vs. 42 per cent among those who do not and 41.5 per cent of those who do not 
know whether they have one or not).
Table 8 Presence of a coordinator and challenging management
 





Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
disagree
Don’t know 0.03
Trade union coordinator 13.6% 35.1% 24.6% 17.3% 5.0% 4.4%  
No trade union coordinator 10.4% 31.5% 29.4% 20.3% 4.6% 3.8%
Don’t know 10.5% 31.0% 32.3% 13.7% 2.9% 9.6%  
In the case studies, we observed that challenging management is a good strategy 
in reduce the prevailing level of confidentiality. After members challenge 
management they are, in general, more free to discuss information coming out 
of the EWC. HHHowever, it was also observed that active challenging by EWC 
members was not likely to encourage management to share information at an 
earlier point. Regarding the early sharing of information, it seemed that the 
overall social climate in the EWC was what was particularly important: where 
relationships were considered friendly and trustful, it was more likely that EWC 
members would receive full and early information and would also be more free to 
talk about the information provided. 
To assess the social climate within a firm, we asked EWC representatives on 
the extent to which they agreed with the following statement: ‘The relationship 
between management and EWC employee representatives can best be described 
as hostile.’ The distribution of the answers is given in Table 9. From this, we can 
clearly see that most EWC representatives disagree or strongly disagree with this 
statement, indicating that the atmosphere is not hostile. Just 1.2 per cent strongly 
agrees while 5.9 per cent simply agrees with the statement. 
Table 9 Social climate
The relationship between management and EWC employee 
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To assess hypothesis 4a and 4b, we can inspect the relationship between this 
variable and the three confidentiality-related questions. For this, we grouped 
respondents on the basis of broad agreement or broad disagreement and 
eliminated those who said ‘don’t know’. 
The results in Table 10 indeed show that there is quite a strong relationship in the 
perception of EWC representatives between social climate and how confidential 
information is treated. The great majority of representatives who agree the 
relationship is hostile also agrees that management withholds information from 
them (72.4 per cent). Of those who strongly disagree with this statement, this 
proportion is only 24.3 per cent. This confirms hypothesis 4a. 
A similar, but somewhat less outspoken, relationship can be observed between 
social climate and the perceived limits on talking about EWC issues because of 
confidentiality concerns. Compared to those who agree relations are not hostile, 
those who think relations are hostile are twice as likely to feel limited in talking 
about EWC issues (52.1 per cent vs. 26.3 per cent). This observation confirms 
hypothesis 4b. 
For the sake of completeness, we also looked at whether the social climate relates 
to the degree to which EWC representatives challenge management over what 
information is regarded as confidential. The pattern is generally the same yet 
less diverse: where there is a hostile climate, EWC members are more likely to 
challenge management over what is confidential than where the climate is not 
hostile. 
Table 10 Social climate and confidentiality requirements
 Withholding information chi-square p-value
Hostile climate? Agree Neutral Disagree <0.01
Agree 72.4%   7.6% 20.0%
Neutral 53.1% 28.8% 18.1%
Disagree 41.0% 25.6% 33.4%
Strongly disagree 24.3% 20.6% 55.2%
 Limit in talking chi-square p-value
Hostile climate? Agree Neutral Disagree <0.01
Agree 52.1% 20.7% 27.3%
Neutral 45.1% 25.6% 29.3%
Disagree 33.4% 23.4% 43.2%
Strongly disagree 26.3% 16.7% 57.1%
 Challenging management chi-square p-value
Hostile climate? Agree Neutral Disagree <0.01
Agree 61.9% 13.9% 24.2%
Neutral 56.2% 26.4% 17.4%
Disagree 50.6% 32.1% 17.4%
Strongly disagree 37.2% 25.5% 37.3%  
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From a comparison between these qualitative insights and the quantitative data, 
we may conclude that only those hypotheses regarding the overall distribution 
in the population could not be confirmed (1a, 2a and 3a). This could have been 
expected as the qualitative study used a small and selected sample of EWCs. 
However, the patterns observed in the case studies (see Table 4) were confirmed 
by the survey data. In the next section, the results of both sections will be discussed 
in more detail. 
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6. Discussion and conclusion
Every representative faces the dilemma of what to do with sensitive information. 
Keep it to yourself to guarantee that you will get more information later, or share 
it with ordinary members to inform them and gain input on how to proceed? Or, 
alternatively, challenge the confidential nature of the information so it can be 
shared without risk? Obviously, the way representatives deal with confidential 
information (or do not cope with it) will have an impact on their work. In EWCs, 
some extra layers of complexity can be added given the different national traditions 
and regulations regarding such information. 
Interestingly, the subject has attracted only scant attention in the EWC literature. 
For this reason, this paper has presented an explorative set of case studies on the 
issue, building on the industrial psychology literature. Insights from these case 
studies were used to develop hypotheses which, in a second stage, were checked 
using quantitative survey results. 
The study aims to provide insight into the kind of confidentiality issues confronting 
EWCs, how they deal with this and how this affects the way they function. 
Three of the four case studies (A, B and C) show that, even though management 
shares little sensitive information, they still deem it to have a confidential nature, 
thereby limiting the possibilities for employee representatives on the EWC 
to communicate with employees at national level. This is paradoxical as the 
confidentiality requirement is designed for when management shares sensitive 
(and early) information with EWC members. We defined this as ‘illegitimate 
confidentiality’, the predominance of which was confirmed by the quantitative 
analysis. 
When this unjustified use of confidentiality requirements is responded to with 
active handling strategies by the EWC, confidentiality requirements are, generally, 
softened. EWCs can be confrontational (e.g. by refusing to meet) or, alternatively, 
they might engage in a search for compromise. This insight finds support both in 
the case studies as well as in the analysis of the survey results. 
Active handling strategies enable EWCs to communicate information more freely, 
but they do not resolve the main problem faced by representatives in these three 
EWCs: late information and/or the withholding of information. In each of these 
three cases, the information and consultation process could be called defunct since 
the EWCs are neither informed nor consulted in a timely manner: management 
often seeks to keep sensitive information to itself until a final decision has been 
taken. 
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In the case of EWC D, the EWC was informed in a timely fashion and properly 
consulted. In the case of EWC B, the select committee received early information 
and was consulted. They therefore received information which was, according to 
them, rightly marked as being confidential. In both cases, employee representatives 
handled this confidentiality in an ‘accommodating’ way. However, the reason why 
case D as a whole was informed and consulted in a timely way was because its select 
committee made efforts to establish formal cooperation between management 
and the EWC. In contrast, the select committee in EWC B did not make this sort 
of effort. This explains why we defined the remaining level of confidentiality in 
EWC D as legitimate while we regarded that in the select committee of EWC B, in 
contrast, as illegitimate.
In case D and in the select committee of EWC B, it is remarkable how often the issue 
of trust was mentioned as one of the reasons why management shared information 
early (under confidentiality requirements). Exploring the survey data, we can see 
that the relationship between having non-hostile relations is very closely related 
with management sharing information and employee representatives thus feeling 
freer to discuss issues regarding the EWC.  
Drawing a conclusion from the qualitative information, we can say that active 
handling strategies, such as ‘forcing’ and ‘compromising’ can improve the 
operation of an EWC by focusing on the issue of information being illegitimately 
marked as confidential. Here, EWC representatives should be encouraged actively 
to challenge the confidential nature of certain information. This, however, does 
not seem to stimulate management to share more information. To reduce the 
withholding of information by management, more fundamental changes in its 
relationship with the EWC seem necessary. 
Putting the insights from the qualitative and quantitative information together, 
we observed that most of the hypotheses we made based on the case studies could 
be confirmed by the survey results. Only the first three hypotheses tested (1a, 2a 
and 3a) were not confirmed. These hypotheses were, not surprisingly, related 
to the extent to which something was likely to occur within the population. In 
assessing the overall distribution of a characteristic in a population, case studies 
(and case studies with a clear selection criterion) are not a good indicator. Yet, all 
the hypotheses on the relationships between the variables were confirmed by the 
survey findings. 
The main conclusions from both the qualitative and quantitative information can 
be summarised as follows:
 – confidentiality and the withholding of information are topics of concern for 
a large proportion of EWC representatives
 – paradoxically, withholding information often goes together with strict 
confidentiality requirements. This is at odds with the reasoning of policy-
makers, for whom early information was intended to go together with 
confidentiality requirements and late information with fewer confidentiality 
requirements 
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 – challenging management over what is confidential helps in reducing 
confidentiality requirements, but does not seem to result in management 
giving earlier information
 – having the support of a trade union coordinator helps the EWC in 
challenging management over what information is confidential 
 – early information (and low confidentiality requirements) goes hand-
in-hand with trustful and non-adversarial relationships (partnership 
strategies) between management and employee representatives. 
The main question (for future research) arising from this working paper is, 
therefore, in what conditions and under which circumstances might a trustful, 
non-hostile relationship develop between employee and employer representatives 
in an EWC. For this, future research should look at the experiences of employee 
representatives from countries other than Belgium. We set out above that one of 
the conditions for evolving towards a ‘participatory’ EWC is to create a collective 
identity. However, for this to happen, employee representatives from different 
countries and industrial relations cultures need to work together in order to 
develop a clear view and strategy out of which they could operate as a single 
team (Stirling and Tully 2004). What could also be interesting in this respect is 
a comparison between the experiences of employee representatives and those 
of employers, in particular which aspects management representatives point to 
as crucial in order to obtain sustainable information and consultation practices 
without the presence of illegitimate confidentiality constraints. 
We started this working paper with the story of an employee EWC representative 
that received early information and was properly consulted. This was combined 
with strict rules regarding confidentiality. In his words, ‘What goes on in Europe 
stays in Europe.’ While this might mean that the representative struggles from time 
to time to complete his tasks, there are arguments to defend strict confidentiality 
where the information provided is early and sensitive. However, throughout these 
case studies, and from what we observe arising from the survey data, this story is 
the exception rather than the rule. For the most part, EWC representatives who feel 
constrained by confidentiality rules are not the ones receiving early information. 
This suggests that confidentiality requirements are often deployed not to enable 
real consultation (as they should), but rather to disable the EWC from carrying out 
its tasks (as they should not). 
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